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I.  INTRODUCTION   
Some neuroscientists claim they can visualize brain images of 
deception,1 an idea which piques our imagination and excites our 
 
∗  Professor, The University of Akron School of Law.  Thanks to Michael Pardo, J. Peter Rosenfeld, 
John Meixner, and Andrew Balmer for comments on drafts.  Particular thanks to Kristen Andrews 
for all her research for this article, Jennifer Woloschyn and Jason Fuller of Akron Law Review for 
the work on this symposium, and Matthew Powell for his efforts tracking down sources.  Any errors 
are the author’s. 
 1. See, e.g.,  D.D. Langleben et al., Brain Activity During Simulated Deception: An Event-
Related Functional Magnetic Resonance Study, 15 NEUROIMAGE 727, 731 (2002) (stating that 
results indicate that fMRI can detect neural correlates of cognitive differences between truth and 
deception); K. Luan Phan et al., Neural Correlates of Telling Lies: A Functional Magnetic 
Resonance Imaging Study at 4 Tesla, 12 ACAD. RADIOLOGY 164, 169 (2005) (discussing the 
different brain regions that appear to be associated with deception); F. Andrew Kozel et al., 
Detecting Deception Using Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging, 2005 J. BIO. PSYCHIATRY 
605, 611 (2005) (claiming that using fMRI, scientists were able to detect deception with a 
cooperative individual); G. Ganis et al., Neural Correlates of Different Types of Deception: An fMRI 
1
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deepest concerns.  At the Neuroscience, Law & Government 
Symposium, two scientists described their research on the neuroimaging 
of deception while other scholars considered the benefits, shortcomings, 
and dangers of such neuroimages.  The foundational philosophical 
concern, of course, is whether we think it is wise to allow the 
government and justice system to invade the privacy of thought: the last 
great wilderness on Earth. 
As a matter of evidence, however, the science poses formidable 
juridical concerns about defining deception and determining what can be 
properly inferred from the images generated.  As this introduction details 
briefly, the historical use of various forms of forensic science should 
alert us to the potential dangers that may be implicated in the uses of 
these new images.  And as the article explains, the neuroimages of 
deception are far from courtroom-ready. 
For those scientists attempting to depict neuroimages of deception, 
adequately defining the concept of deception is more complicated and 
outcome-determining than one might imagine: is it uttering false words, 
responding misleadingly to requests to push one button or another, or 
simply attempting to think untrue thoughts on demand?2  And while 
defining deception is a difficult problem,3 perhaps another focus needs 
to be not on deception, but on what we mean by truth.  One of the 
primary goals of trials, we repeat like a mantra, is the search for truth.4  
 
Investigation, 13 CEREBRAL CORTEX 830, 833 (2003) (finding that patterns of brain activation are 
different when people tell lies than they are when people tell the truth). 
 2. See, e.g., Phan et al., supra note 1, at 166 (noting that subjects were instructed to lie by 
pressing buttons about certain playing cards); Langleben et al., supra note 1, at 729 (noting that 
subjects were told they could keep a reward if they kept the identity of the card from the computer); 
Sean A. Spence et al., Speaking of Secrets and Lies: The Contribution of Ventrolateral Prefrontal 
Cortex to Vocal Deception, 40 NEUROIMAGE 1411, 1413 (2008) (noting that subjects had the choice 
of when to be truthful or when to deceive when answering questions vocally); F. Andrew Kozel et 
al., A Pilot Study of Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging Brain Correlates of Deception in 
Healthy Young Men, 16 J. NEUROPSYCHIATRY CLIN. NEUROSCIENCE 295, 298 (2004) (noting that 
subjects were instructed to deceptively point toward the object that did not contain hidden money). 
 3. Various studies define deception in different ways.  Compare, e.g., Ganis et al., supra 
note 1, at 830 (defining deception as “when one person attempts to convince another to accept as 
correct what the prevaricator believes is incorrect”), with Kozel et al., supra note 2, at 295 (2004) 
(defining deception as the “purposeful misleading of another”).  Other studies were designed to 
distinguish between erroneous memories and intentional deception.  See Tatia M.C.Lee et al., Are 
Errors Differentiable from Deceptive Responses when Feigning Memory Impairment? An fMRI 
Study,  69 BRAIN & COGNITION 406, 407 (2009); Nobuhito Abe et al., Neural Correlates of True 
Memory, False Memory, and Deception,18 CEREBRAL CORTEX 2811, 2811(2008). 
 4. See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 102 (providing that “[t]hese rules shall be construed to secure 
fairness in administration, elimination of unjustifiable expense and delay, and promotion of growth 
and development of the law of evidence to the end that the truth may be ascertained and proceedings 
justly determined”). 
2
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As if truth is objective, discoverable, and unchanging.  But perception, 
viewpoint, bias, error, and interpretation clearly affect one’s construction 
of truth.  Like memory, truth may well be reconstructive,5 as may be the 
very idea of evidentiary reliability.6  In our evidential search for truth, 
there has been an historical belief from one generation to the next that 
science will lead us to truth.  Trials rely on fingerprint and DNA 
comparisons, ballistics and tool marks, child sexual abuse experts, and 
opinions from physicians.  Nevertheless, as we know both from history 
and from the analysis of data generated by the Innocence Project 
exonerations, using experts to prove the truth has often been a flawed 
endeavor.7  As an empirical study of the first 200 defendants exonerated 
by the innocence project concludes, faulty “[f]orensic evidence was the 
second leading type of evidence supporting these erroneous 
convictions.”8  Although possibly possessed of fine intentions, experts 
make mistakes and no matter how good the science, there is always an 
expected rate of error.9  Despite those experts who claim their form of 
expertise is infallible, science disagrees.10 
 
 5. “[M]emory representations are not static but rather are subject to considerable change 
over time.  Details may be lost and information in storage may be modified so as to increase its 
consistency vis-à-vis underlying knowledge.”  Peter A. Ornstein, Stephen J. Ceci & Elizabeth F. 
Loftus, Adult Recollections of Childhood Abuse: Cognitive and Developmental Perspectives, 4 
PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 1025, 1034 (1998).  Perhaps truth, like goodness, is not as clear-cut as 
one would hope. 
 6. Professor Jennifer Mnookin makes a related point in discussing the history of testimony 
about fingerprint comparisons: 
There is no determinable thing called reliability that exists apart from our conceptions of 
reliability.  Whether something is truly reliable when seen from some idealized 
Archimedean vantage point is simply the wrong question, for the Archimedean vantage 
point . . . eludes us.  With the passage of time, our perceptions of reliability may change; 
we may come to believe that something we used to believe is no longer credible.  But 
our new view as much as our old view is a ‘mere’ perception of reliability. 
Jennifer L. Mnookin, Scripting Expertise: The History of Handwriting Identification 
Evidence and the Judicial Construction of Reliability, 87 VA. L. REV. 1723, 1743 
(2001). 
 7. See Facts on Post-Conviction DNA Exonerations, http://www.innocenceproject.org/ 
Content/351.php (last visited Mar. 12, 2009) (discussing convictions that resulted from flawed 
forensic science); Brandon L. Garrett, Judging Innocence, 108 COLUMB. L. REV. 55, 82-83 (2008); 
Jane Campbell Moriarty, “Misconvictions,” Science, and the Ministers of Justice, 86 NEB. L. REV. 
1, 7 (2007) (both discussing the role of forensic science errors in wrongful convictions). 
 8. Garrett, supra note 7, at 81. 
 9. See 1 DAVID L. FAIGMAN ET AL., MODERN SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE: THE LAW AND SCIENCE 
OF EXPERT TESTIMONY § 1:20 (2005) (discussing the concept that all applied science has some error 
rate). 
 10. Compare United States v. Havvard, 117 F. Supp. 2d 848, 854, aff’d, 260 F.3d 597, 599 
(7th Cir. 2001) (noting that the government’s fingerprint comparison expert testified that the rate of 
error is essentially zero), with Simon A. Cole, More than Zero: Accounting for Error in Latent 
3
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Most recently, we learned again the potential fallibility of scientific 
evidence when the National Academy of Sciences issued its report on 
forensic science (“NAS Report”), questioning the foundation for much 
of the forensic science evidence so many courts have routinely admitted.  
The NAS Report concludes that the forensic science community of 
professionals has fallen far short in establishing either the validity of 
their approach or the accuracy of their conclusions.  The courts, it notes, 
have been wholly ineffective in their gate-keeping obligations with 
respect to forensic science.11 
In the evidential search for truth via the medium of science, we are 
often concerned with the questions and problems of causation in trials, 
without recognizing the frequent tendency to erroneously infer 
causation.  With new scientific discoveries possessing forensic 
application, there is the always-present danger of confusing correlation 
with causation, assuming a cause and effect relationship where none 
exists.  It is a human tendency to make inferential leaps of causation—
what we might term insights.12  However, a recurrent problem with this 
inferential Archimedes-like leap from the bathtub is that it is often laden 
both with error and bias.13 
During the Salem witchcraft trials, Cotton Mather consulted leading 
treatises on the scientific proof of witchcraft—as science was understood 
in the Seventeenth Century.14  In large part, Mather, who fancied himself 
a man of science, was not impressed with the use of ordeals and torture: 
“going to the Devil for help against the Devil,” as he might have put it.15  
 
Fingerprint Identification, 95 J. CRIMINAL L. & CRIMINOLOGY 985, 987-88 (2005) (noting that 
despite claims that fingerprint comparison is infallible, it is far from error free), and Faigman, supra 
note 9.  See NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, COMM. ON IDENTIFYING THE NEEDS OF THE FORENSIC 
SCIENCE COMMUNITY, STRENGTHENING FORENSIC SCIENCE IN THE UNITED STATES: A PATH 
FORWARD 4-5 (2009), available at http://www.nap.edu/catalog/12589.html [hereinafter NAS 
FORENSIC SCIENCE REPORT] (prepublication copy). 
 11. NAS FORENSIC SCIENCE REPORT, supra note 10, at 3-19. 
 12. See generally BERNARD J. F. LONERGAN, INSIGHT: A STUDY OF HUMAN 
UNDERSTANDING (3d ed. 1970) (on the nature of insight); Mary Ann Glendon, Why Cross 
Boundaries?, 53 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 971, 974-77 (1996) (discussing the concept of insight). 
 13. See, e.g., D. Michael Risinger et al., The Daubert/Kumho Implications of Observer Effects 
in Forensic Science: Hidden Problems of Expectation and Suggestion, 90 CAL. L. REV. 1, 13-15 
(2002) (discussing, inter alia, problems of the expectation bias in forensic science).  See NAS 
FORENSIC SCIENCE REPORT, supra note 10, at 4-5 (discussing the potential bias problems in 
laboratories). 
 14. See generally Jane Campbell Moriarty, Wonders of the Invisible World: Prosecutorial 
Syndrome and Profile Evidence in the Salem Witchcraft Trials, 26 VT. L. REV. 43 (2001) 
(discussing the witchcraft trials in depth). 
 15. Id. at 59 & n.94 (citing Wendel D. Craker, Spectral Evidence, Non-Spectral Acts of 
Witchcraft, and Confession at Salem in 1692, 40 HIST. J. 331, 343 (1997)). 
4
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Rather, he was most impressed with a scientific causation argument: If, 
after a suspected witch curses, there follows death, illness or affliction, 
there is a presumption of witchcraft.16  Thus, in the Bridget Bishop trial, 
evidence was introduced that after Bishop had quarreled with a 
particular family, the family’s pig was taken with strange fits and began 
foaming at the mouth; these events were believed to be sure evidence 
that Bishop had bewitched the pig.  This supposed relationship, which I 
have termed elsewhere “Bewitched Pig Syndrome,” was considered 
solid, scientific evidence of witchcraft for more than a century.17  Today, 
we might be inclined to note the “post hoc propter hoc” fallacy—“after 
which, because of which.”18 
Contemporary judges and juries are unlikely to be impressed by 
“Bewitched Pig Syndrome” testimony.19  Yet many, both in the 
courtroom and outside of it, have faith in unproven causation.  Consider 
the prevalence of legal claims resting on unproven causation and the 
public’s trust in the efficacy of “miraculous” but untested herbal cures.20  
While scientists recognize that the plural of anecdote is not data but 
simply anecdotes,21 courts and the public are not so convinced. 
In contraposition to most forensic science, polygraph evidence has 
encountered many stones in the pass-way to becoming courtroom 
evidence.  The Supreme Court majority determined there was no 
consensus as to the reliability of polygraph evidence, and a majority of 
state and federal courts disallow it.22  Nonetheless, I do not believe 
courts are primarily concerned with the reliability of such instruments, 
given their willingness to routinely admit all types of evidence with 
proven track records of unreliability with nary a mention of such 
 
 16. Id. at 60-61 (discussing the Salem judges’ reliance on William Perkins’ Discourse of the 
Damned Art of Witchcraft and Richard Bernard’s Guide to Grand-Jury Men). 
 17. Id. at 71. 
 18. “Which/witch” pun unintended but appreciated. 
 19. But see David L. Faigman, The Syndromic Lawyer Syndrome: A Psychological Theory of 
Evidentiary Munificence, 67 U. COLO. L. REV. 817, 817 (1996) (discussing relaxed evidentiary 
standards that courts employ to admit syndrome evidence). 
 20. See, e.g., In re Breast Implant Litig., 11 F. Supp. 2d 1217, 1227 (D. Colo. 1998) 
(concluding that no controlled epidemiological study found a causative relationship between 
silicone breast implants and any known connective-tissue or autoimmune disease); ROBERT L. 
PARK, VOODOO SCIENCE: THE ROAD FROM FOOLISHNESS TO FRAUD 46-48 (2000) (describing the 
public’s belief in alternative healing, despite the lack of a foundation for many claims). 
 21. The proper attribution to the author of this phrase seems unlikely.  For more on the murky 
origins of the excellent but difficult-to-attribute phrase, see The Matthew Effect, 
http://bearcastle.com/blog/?m=20050808 (last visited Mar. 12, 2009). 
 22. United States v. Scheffer, 523 U.S. 303, 309-11 (1998) (discussing the scientific 
disagreement of polygraph reliability and courts’ widespread disfavor of such evidence). 
5
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concerns.23  Rather, the judicial distain seems to center on expert 
evidence that opines on whether a given witness is telling the truth.24  
Courts’ disfavor of the polygraph may be due to their long-stated 
appreciation of juries’ ability to weigh credibility or the seemingly 
innate dislike we all share of our private thoughts being exposed. 
As a form of expert testimony, polygraph evidence is riddled with 
causation problems.  A key concern is that it conflates correlation with 
causation; its design measures anxiety or arousal as manifested in blood 
pressure, galvanic skin response, and respiration, resting on the 
assumption that lying will provoke an anxious response.25  But some 
polygraph subjects are not anxious and do not exhibit physiological 
correlates of anxiety.26  And asking an innocent person “did you kill 
John Doe” may well evoke an anxious (but believed to be guilty) 
reaction.  Additionally, measuring physiological responses to a question 
about murder against a control question like “did you ever steal anything 
as a child” may not be sufficiently discerning to determine serious lies 
from truth, since such a control question cannot pose the same level of 
stress that the real life questions can.27  Thus, the first problem is that the 
polygraph uses anxiety as a proxy for guilt, both overreaching and 
under-reaching, not recognizing that while there may often be some 
correlation between anxiety and guilt, the proof of actual causation is not 
as surefooted as claimed.  The second problem is that it is incredibly 
difficult to create real-world consequences in control questions.  The 
third problem is that countermeasures are potentially effective against 
the polygraph, competently disguising a “guilt” reaction.28 
The use of science in the search for truth poses consistent 
evidentiary problems of definition, causation, validity, accuracy, 
inferential conclusions unsupported by data, and real-world 
 
 23. See, e.g., Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 899, n.7 (1983) (upholding the decision to 
admit expert testimony about future dangerousness even though experts had indicated it might be 
accurate in only one of three predictions); United States v. Green, 405 F. Supp. 2d 104, 122 (D. 
Mass. 2005) (discussing the unreliability of toolmark and ballistic evidence based on scholarly 
criticism but noting that “court after court” has allowed its admission); NAS FORENSIC SCIENCE 
REPORT, supra note 10, at 3-19. 
 24. 1 JANE CAMPBELL MORIARTY, PSYCHOLOGICAL AND SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE IN CRIMINAL 
TRIALS § 8:23, at 8-34 n.4 (2008) (citing cases disallowing expert testimony about whether a child 
was being truthful in alleging sexual abuse). 
 25. See, e.g., Ganis et al., supra note 1, at 830.  See NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, COMM. 
TO REVIEW THE SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE ON THE POLYGRAPH, THE POLYGRAPH AND LIE DETECTION 
2-3 (2003) [hereinafter POLYGRAPH AND LIE DETECTION]. 
 26. Ganis et al., supra note 1, at 830. 
 27. See, e.g., Langleben et al., supra note 1, at 731. 
 28. See, e.g., POLYGRAPH AND LIE DETECTION, supra note 25, at 139-40. 
6
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complications.  And these evidentiary problems may well be implicated 
in the forensic use of neuroimages of deception.  This article first briefly 
describes the various types of neuroimaging used to detect deception and 
describes some of the specific criticisms that have been leveled at the 
science.  Second, the article outlines the standards governing 
admissibility and explains why the research to date does not yet meet 
any recognized standards of admissibility.  Third, and finally, the article 
suggests that courts act with restraint in deciding questions of 
admissibility of such evidence, recognizing the lessons of historical 
experience with forensic science. 
II.  THE NEUROIMAGING OF DECEPTION 
 A.  Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging as a Detection Device 
Functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) has created a new 
way of visualizing brain activity and allows researchers to examine the 
brain with “higher sensitivity and accuracy . . . [and] view the brain ‘in 
action.’”29  While MRI visualizes anatomical details in living things by 
considering magnetic charges, fMRI records “the difference between 
oxygenated and nonoxygenated blood cells due to their magnetic 
charges, so more active neurons can be distinguished from less active 
ones.”30 
Distinct from MRI, fMRI is correlated with brain function rather 
than brain structure.31  Thus, when an experimental subject is assigned 
specific tasks or functions, the fMRI seeks to detect the correlation 
between mental activities and activated neural systems.32  Although 
based on the same technology as MRI, fMRI measures localized changes 
in the brain as an individual is performing a selected task.33  Unlike 
some other forms of neuroimaging, such as CAT scans and MRI, which 
appear in shades of gray, fMRI data are depicted as vivid and colorful 
 
 29. Jana L. Bufkin & Vickie R. Luttrell, Neuroimaging Studies of Aggressive and Violent 
Behavior, 6 TRAUMA VIOLENCE AND ABUSE 176, 176 (2005). 
 30. JONATHAN D. MORENO, MIND WARS: BRAIN RESEARCH AND NATIONAL DEFENSE 98 
(2006). 
 31. Stephen B. Billick & Stephen P. Sullivan, Neuroimaging in Child and Adolescent 
Psychiatry, in PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE OF FORENSIC PSYCHIATRY 463, 465 (Richard Rosner ed., 
2d ed. 2003). 
 32. MORENO, supra note 30, at 98–99. 
 33. Stacey A. Tovino, The Confidentiality and Privacy Implications of Functional Magnetic 
Resonance Imaging, 33 J.L. MED & ETHICS 844, 844 (2005). 
7
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images in three-dimensional computer-generated images of the brain.34  
Researchers have used fMRI to study a range of conditions and illnesses, 
including Alzheimer’s disease and various psychiatric disorders such as 
schizophrenia and addiction.35  To date, however, few courts have 
admitted fMRI evidence at trial.36 
In recent years, neuroscientists have used fMRI technology to 
attempt to identify brain regions associated with deception.37  
Neuropsychological studies typically rely on blood oxygenation level 
dependent (“BOLD”) fMRI, which “track[s] the changes in blood flow 
that correspond to changes in local brain activity.”38 
Daniel Langleben and his fellow researchers concluded, after a 
small study, that fMRI could detect cognitive neurophysiological 
differences between deception and truth.  “[T]here is a 
neurophysiological difference between deception and truth at the brain 
activation level that can be detected with fMRI.”39  Other research 
studies have made similar claims.40  Dr. Steven Laken, CEO and 
 
 34. Jennifer Kulynych, Note, Psychiatric Neuroimaging Evidence: A High-Tech Crystal 
Ball?, 49 STAN. L. REV. 1249, 1257 (1997). 
 35. Tovino, supra note 33, at 845. 
 36. Jane Campbell Moriarty, Flickering Admissibility: Neuroimaging Evidence in the U.S. 
Courts, 26 BEHAV. SCI. L. 29, 39 (2008). 
 37. MORENO, supra note 30, at 103.  See, e.g., Phan et al., supra note 1, at 169 (discussing 
fMRI results indicated which regions of the brain appear to be engaged when subjects engaged in 
deceptive responses). 
 38. Daniel D. Langleben, Frank M. Dattilio & Thomas G. Guthei, True Lies: Delusions and 
Lie-Detection Technology, 34 J. PSYCHIATRY & L. 351, 359 (2006).  My description of fMRI is, by 
necessity, greatly simplified.  For greater technical explanation of how fMRI functions and its 
limitations, see Nikos K. Logothetis, What we can and what we cannot do with fMRI, 453 NATURE 
869 (2008); David J. Heeger & David Ress, What Does fMRI Tell Us About Neuronal Activity?, 3 
NATURE REVIEWS 143 (2002). 
 39. Langleben et al., supra note 1, at 731. 
 40. Langleben, Dattilio, & Guthei, supra note 38, at 360; accord Langleben et al., supra note 
1, at 731 (results indicated that fMRI can detect neural correlates of cognitive differences between 
truth and deception); Tatia M.C. Lee et al., Lie Detection by Functional Magnetic Resonance 
Imaging, 15 HUMAN BRAIN MAPPING 157 (2002) [hereinafter Lie Detection]; Andrew Kozel et al., 
Functional MRI Detection of Deception After Committing a Mock Sabotage Crime, 54 J. FORENSIC 
SCIENCE 220 (2008) [hereinafter Kozel, Mock Crime]; Donald H. Marks, Mehdi Adineh, & Sudeepa 
Gupta, Determination of Truth from Deception Using Functional MRI and Cognitive Engrams, 5 
THE INTERNET J. RADIOLOGY (2006), http://www.ispub.com/journal/the_internet_journal_of_ 
radiology/volume_5_number_1_35/article_printable/determination_of_truth_from_deception_using
_functional_mri_and_cognitive_engrams.html; Spence et al., supra note 2; Sean A. Spence et al., 
‘Munchausen’s Syndrome by Proxy’ or a ‘Miscarriage of Justice’? An Initial Application of 
Functional Neuroimaging to the Question of Guilt Versus Innocence, 23 EUROPEAN PSYCHIATRY 
309 (2008); Matthias Gamer et al., Covariations among fMRI, Skin Conductance, and Behavioral 
Data During Processing of Concealed Information, 28 HUMAN BRAIN MAPPING 1287 (2007); 
Feroze B. Mohamed et al., Brain Mapping of Deception and Truth Telling About an Ecologically 
Valid Situation: Functional MR Imaging and Polygraph Investigation—Initial Experience, 238 
8
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President of Cephos Corporation, a company designed in part to provide 
neuroimaging deception detection through the use of fMRI, has likewise 
published initial research suggesting that fMRI can detect deception in 
an individual.41  His website for Cephos, however, goes further, 
suggesting that fMRI to test for deception is “likely admissible in court” 
since it meets the reliability standards for admissibility.42  As more fully 
set forth infra, such a claim is wholly insupportable. 
B.  Shortcomings of fMRI to Detect Deception 
Although the fMRI studies of deception done to date are both 
fascinating and provocative, there is much agreement that the science is 
in its early stages and is not at all ready to be admissible evidence.  In a 
recent article published in a British Psychological Society Journal, Dr. 
Sean A. Spence, a researcher involved in the field, notes that there are 
roughly only sixteen published peer-reviewed studies from essentially 
four groups of reviewers.43  To date, he critiques, there is a marked 
absence of replication by investigators of their own key findings and 
there are inconsistencies in the procedures and methodologies used by 
researchers.44  Another group of scientists involved in the field has noted 
that results are not always consistent or reproducible.45  A third group of 
scientists working in the area expresses concern that the design and 
analysis methods across the studies vary considerably, “making it 
 
RADIOLOGY 679 (2006); Frank Andrew Kozel, Tamara M. Padgett, & Mark S. George, A 
Replication Study of the Neural Correlates of Deception, 118 BEHAVIORAL NEUROSCIENCE 852 
(2004); Kozel et al., supra note 2; Daniel D. Langleben et al., Telling the Truth from Lie in 
Individual Subjects with Fast Event-Related fMRI, 26 HUMAN BRAIN MAPPING 262 (2005); 
Christos Davatzikos, Classifying Spatial Patterns of Brain Activity with Machine Learning 
Methods: Application to Lie Detection, 28 NEUROIMAGE 663 (2005); Phan et al., supra note 1; 
Kozel et al., supra note 1; Ganis et al., supra note 1; Nubuhito Abe et al., Deceiving Others: 
Distinct Neural Responses of the Prefrontal Cortex and Amygdala in Simple Fabrication and 
Deception with Social Interactions, 19 J. COGNITIVE NEUROSCIENCE 287 (2007); G.T. Monteleone 
et al., Detection of Deception Using fMRI: Better than Chance, but Well Below Perfection, 2 
SOCIAL NEUROSCIENCE 1 (2008); Abe et al., supra note 3; Lee et al., supra note 3; Hakun et. al, 
Toward Clinical Trials of Lie Detection with fMRI, 12 SOCIAL NEUROSCIENCE 1 (2008). 
 41. See, e.g., Kozel et al., supra note 1, at 611. 
 42. See fMRI Testing & Legal Admissibility, http://www.cephoscorp.com/admissibilty.htm 
(last visited Feb. 18, 2009).  This statement is inaccurate.  Currently, while fMRI is sometimes 
admitted in courts to depict injury and illness, it has not been introduced to prove deception. 
 43. See Sean A. Spence, Playing Devil’s Advocate: The Case Against fMRI Lie Detection, 13 
LEGAL & CRIMINOLOGICAL PSYCHOLOGY 11, 13 (2008) (a few more have since been published, but 
the total number appears to be around twenty). 
 44. Id. at 24. 
 45. See Ganis et al., supra note 1, at 830 (noting that the results of three studies published in 
2001 and 2002 “have not been consistent”). 
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difficult to integrate the results.”46  Daniel Langleben candidly admitted 
in an early article that several critical aspects of the “neurobiology of 
deception” have not yet been studied, including tests that accurately 
model real-life situations.47  In a more recent article, Dr. Langleben 
notes that the accuracy from two available laboratory datasets ranges 
between 76 and 90%, which is a “strong indication for more extensive 
testing rather than a focus of debate on whether the upper limits of this 
range is sufficient for court evidence.”48  Other scholars provide 
additional critiques, noting that fMRI lie detection is “still in its 
infancy”; they argue that only limited conclusions can be drawn from the 
various studies done to date.49  At the University of Akron School of 
Law Symposium on Neuroscience, Law & Government, Dr. Langleben 
quite candidly admitted that “it’s just not ready.”50 
There are numerous potential problems with drawing conclusions 
from the studies: The studies are small, ranging from a single person to 
less than thirty;51 the studies have used only healthy and primarily young 
subjects;52 there are concerns that countermeasures may be effective, as 
 
 46. Kozel, Mock Crime, supra note 40, at 220. 
 47. Langleben, Dattilio, & Guthei, supra note 38, at 360.  See also Kozel, Mock Crime, supra 
note 40, at 231 (noting that while the mock crime employed by researchers provides a “diagnostic 
ability . . . greater than chance, future work is focused on improving specificity and using more 
realistic testing in order to enhance the utility of this technology in real-world applications”). 
 48. Daniel D. Langleben, Detection of Deception with fMRI: Are We There Yet?, 13 LEGAL & 
CRIMINOLOGICAL PSYCHOL. 1, 4 (2008).  See also Ganis et al., supra note 1, at 835 (“[s]ubstantial . 
. . research . . . on deception paradigms and . . . analysis methods remains to be conducted before we 
can fully assess the potential of fMRI as a lie detection device.”). 
 49. Jonathan H. Marks, Interrogational Neuroimaging in Counterterrorism: A “No-Brainer” 
or a Human Rights Hazard?, 33 AM. J.L. & MED. 483, 489 (2007); accord Michael S. Pardo, 
Neuroscience Evidence, Legal Culture, and Criminal Procedure, 33 AM. J. CRIM. L. 301, 319 
(2006) (noting various concerns, including that researchers admit that fMRI deception studies are 
just beginning and that the studies to date involve small sample size and relatively low stakes); 
Henry T. Greely & Judy Illes, Neuroscience-Based Lie Detection: The Urgent Need for Regulation, 
33 AM. J.L. & MED. 377, 402 (2007) (stating it is as yet only a ‘‘promising technology,’’ and 
discussing the shortcomings of the studies).  For a concise evaluation of the studies and their 
limitations, see generally Joseph R. Simpson, Functional MRI Lie Detection: Too Good to be 
True?, 36 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 491 (2008). 
 50. Daniel Langleben, Speaker at the University of Akron Law Review Symposium: 
Neuroscience, Law and Government (Sept. 26, 2008), http://www.uakron.edu/law/ 
neuroscience/panel1.php. 
 51. See, e.g., Lie Detection, supra note 40, at 158 (only six male volunteers were analyzed in 
the study); see sources cited supra note 40 (all but two studies contained less than thirty 
participants); Hakun, supra note 40, at 2 (study involved one participant). 
 52. See, e.g., Mohamed et al., supra note 40, at 680 (“the experiments were performed in 11 
healthy volunteers (five female and six male subjects; mean age, 28.9 years) who were screened for 
drug use, neurological and neuropsychiatric illness . . . .”); Phan et al., supra note 1, at 165 (all 
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they are with the polygraph;53 and the studies require participants who 
are both compliant and honest in the execution of the test.54  Additional 
concerns include the possibility of conflating correlation with causation, 
where the section of the brain thought to be tied to deception is tied to 
other thought processes as well; the variability of individual brains and 
wide variations in “normal”;55 the inability to apply conclusions drawn 
from a group to conclusions about a given individual;56 and the lack of 
“real-life” consequences in the studies.  In a recent study that created a 
mock crime to more closely approximate real world situations, the 
authors stated the test might be helpful for excluding the innocent but 
was not very helpful in “ruling in” the guilty.57 
Most of the neuroimaging studies focus on very simple sample 
questions, as the very structure of scientific testing demands.58  In order 
to generate usable data, the design of the tests is closely cabined.  
Nonetheless, using neuroimages to visualize deception in the real world 
may be more complicated.  Will it appear as though subjects are lying 
when they are responding to what turns out to be a complicated 
question?  For example, assume in a murder case the subject is asked 
whether he was with the victim on the night of the murder.  The subject 
may need to ponder the question before answering, since he was with the 
victim in the late afternoon but not in the evening (when the victim was 
murdered).  Since there are studies indicating that lies are associated 
 
participants were healthy and without a history of head injury, learning disability, or neurological 
illness). 
 53. Spence et al., supra note 2, at 1415 (The authors admit one of the limitations to the study 
was the lack of data regarding the “ground truth” of the subjects’ embarrassing memories.  The 
authors did not interview others to collaborate their stories, or ask for evidence.  Therefore, the 
subjects could have fabricated the embarrassing stories they were asked about.). 
 54. See Kozel et al., supra note 1, at 612 (“Any subject who refuses to answer questions, 
randomly answers questions, moves their head, or refuses to enter the scanner would not be able to 
be tested.”). 
 55. Billick & Sullivan, supra note 31, at 46. 
 56. Ganis et al., supra note 1, at 835 (noting that most studies use group analyses to detect 
deception); Kozel et al., supra note 1, at 605 (noting that most studies look at deception at the group 
level). 
 57. See Kozel, Mock Crime, supra note 40, at 231 (proving that the method used to detect 
deception was “sensitive but suffers from low specificity on this task for whether a subject 
committed a mock crime, [indicating it] . . . would be helpful to ‘rule out’ a potential subject . . . but 
not very helpful in ‘ruling in’ a suspect . . . .”).  Accord Lee, supra note 3, at 410 (recognizing that 
their study “is hardly comparable to real-life situations, where the detection of intentional faked 
responses may result in serious consequences . . . .”). 
 58. See, e.g., Kozel et al., supra note 1, at 606 (in which subjects took a ring or a watch and 
were then told to lie about the object they took). 
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with a longer lapse time between question and answer,59 will the 
complication of the question confound the result if he answers “no,” 
since he had to expend energy to sort through the day/evening issue? 
Moreover, questions arise about brain depiction differences 
between a lie that is well-rehearsed, as opposed to one that is either 
spontaneous or just an erroneous memory.  A few studies have looked at 
some of these issues,60 but more are needed.  The studies only use 
subjects who are of exceptional mental and physical health.  What will 
happen when they start testing more representative subjects, who may be 
psychologically impaired, use drugs or alcohol excessively, and have 
serious reasons to try to fool the examiners? 
For now, the most that can be said is that the preliminary data are 
fascinating but sparse.61  While there is little doubt that fMRI works well 
for neural research, there are innumerable questions about the extent of 
what can be stated with certainty about the interpretation of the images 
generated.  Every month reveals new discoveries about the areas of the 
brain that are implicated in deception studies, which in and of itself 
raises concerns about the underlying assumptions of brain region 
activity.62 
According to Professors Greely and Illes, whose interdisciplinary 
article details a number of concerns with the fMRI/deception studies, the 
studies “do not prove that [fMRI] . . . is currently effective as a lie 
detector in the real world, at any accuracy level . . . .”63  Professor 
Moreno remarks that the techniques are not yet “specific enough to 
predict when a particular person is being intentionally deceptive.”64 
 
 59. Sean A. Spence et al., A Cognitive Neurobiological Account of Deception: Evidence from 
Functional Neuroimaging, 359 PHIL. TRANSACTIONS. ROYAL. SOC. LOND. B 1755, 1760 (2004) 
(noting an increase in response time of lies relative to truthful responding). 
 60. Lee et al., supra note 3, at 407; Abe et al., supra note 3, at 2811; Ganis et al., supra note 
1, at 831. 
 61. At the time of this article, there appear to be only about twenty-one published studies on 
the neuroimaging of deception.  See supra note 40 for a comprehensive list of the studies published 
on the neuroimaging of deception. 
 62. Ganis et al. remark that there are not “brain regions . . . specialized for lying; rather . . . 
[we assume] various types of lies . . . [involve] different combinations of general-purpose cognitive 
processes which, as ensemble, may provide reliable neural signatures for various types of lies.  
Ganis et al., supra note 1, at 833.  Recently, another study found, surprisingly, that rather than just 
the involvement of the inferior parietal and inferior frontal regions, the limbic system (the amygdala 
and the hippocampus) was activated in response to one deceptive answer.  See Hakun, supra note 
40, at 5.  The study theorizes that the subject may have experienced some emotional reaction or 
moral dilemma related to the specific question.  Id. at 7-8. 
 63. Greely & Illes, supra note 49, at 402 (emphasis in original). 
 64. MORENO, supra note 30, at 103. 
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In addition to the limitations inherent in the studies themselves, the 
technical process of creating neuroimages poses concerns about the 
conclusions generated from these images.  For example, one group of 
commentators note in a recent article, “[a]lthough . . . [neuroimages] are 
described as ‘real time’ brain images, the temporal resolution of the 
hemodynamic response is several seconds while events relevant to 
information processing are at least three orders of magnitude faster.”65  
The design of studies, they note, involves statistical “analyses of 
comparison.”66  Yet, none of the steps are “standardized from one 
technology to the next, or from one machine or laboratory to the next.”67  
Thus, the problems are not just with the design of the studies but with 
the technological mechanics of their implementation as well.  And the 
briefly-described critiques are a handful of the many articles discussing 
limitations of fMRI to detect deception. 
Finally, the neuroimaging studies use voluntary subjects who agree 
to be honest and compliant.68  Without question, such requirements do 
not match real-world application.  In sum, the studies raise as many 
questions as they answer. 
III.  “BRAIN FINGERPRINTING” AND BEOS 
Research is also being conducted with electroencephalograph 
technology (EEG) to find neural correlates of deception.  These studies 
are not technically neuroimages but rather graphs depicting changes in 
brain waves.  Although it appears as though there are interesting and 
promising studies underway, analysis of them is beyond the scope of this 
article which is focusing on neuroimages.69 
 
 65. Joseph H. Baskin, Judith G. Edersheim & Bruce H. Price, Is a Picture Worth a Thousand 
Words? Neuroimaging in the Courtroom, 33 AM. J.L. & MED. 239, 249 (2007). 
 66. Id. 
 67. Id.  Other researchers note the problems of comparing results of one study to another, due 
to different paradigms used in each study.  Phan et al., supra note 1, at 171 (criticizing studies that 
offer monetary incentive to lie). 
 68. See Kozel et al., supra note 1, at 612 (noting that the technique used “requires a 
cooperative subject”).  While the study authors note that the test subjects were told they would be 
given a $50 bonus if it could not be determined when they were lying, such incentive in no way 
compares to real life consequences for crime suspects.  Id. at 606, 611.  Simpson remarks that if 
subjects refuse to enter the scanner, refuse to respond to questions, give nonresponsive answers, or 
even shake their heads during the exam, the results may not be usable.  Simpson, supra note 49, at 
493. 
 69. See, e.g., J. Peter Rosenfeld et al., The Complex Trial Protocol (CTP): A New, 
Countermeasure-resistant, Accurate, P300-based Method for Detection of Concealed Information, 
45 PSYCHOPHYSIOLOGY 906 (2008) and references cited therein. 
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However, since there has been an attempt to use less well-studied 
forms of EEG at trial in the US and in India, this article addresses them: 
the inaptly-named “brain fingerprinting” and the Brain Electrical 
Oscillation Signature test (“BEOS”).  The coiner of the brain 
fingerprinting term, Dr. Lawrence A. Farwell, claims that the brain emits 
a characteristic wave response when presented with a known stimulus.  
Thus, when the brain recognizes something as significant in the current 
context in which it is presented, the brain reacts predictably.  Farwell 
conducted an experiment in which lay persons and FBI agents were 
shown acronyms known only to agents.  Apparently, only the agents’ 
brains exhibited this recognition wave.70 
In essence, the claim is that this device captures a recognition wave 
of the brain.  Farwell claims that using EEG technology, he can detect 
changes in brain waves that take place over a very short period of time 
(approximately one second).  These changes can be classified as having 
relevant information (knowledge) and not having such information (no 
knowledge).  Even when the subjects were intentionally trying to 
conceal knowledge, Farwell claims that the test could detect accurately 
whether the subjects knew or did not know.71
 
 
IV.  CRITICISM OF BRAIN FINGERPRINTING AND BEOS 
The first concern is of course that recognition (if indeed that is what 
is displayed) may arise in a variety of ways—some quite innocent.  
Second, this test appears to misunderstand the nature of memory, which 
does not record and recall information like a video recorder, but layers 
memory over memory, changes, loses, restructures, and adapts to 
continual addition of new information.  Every time a memory is recalled, 
it is altered.72 
 
 70. See Lawrence A. Farwell, Farwell Brain Fingerprinting: A New Paradigm in Criminal 
Investigations, Jan. 12, 1999, at 5.5.1, http://www.mindcontrolforums.com/bf-research.htm; see 
Lawrence A. Farwell & Sharon S. Smith, Using Brain MERMER Testing to Detect Knowledge 
Despite Efforts to Conceal, 46 J. FORENSIC SCIENCE 135 (2001).  Brain fingerprinting is an inapt 
term, since fingerprinting, a form of individualization, seeks to match an unknown sample with a 
known sample.  Brain fingerprinting does not involve any form of attempted individualized 
matching.  Rather, the term was likely chosen to draw on the supposed trustworthiness of 
fingerprinting comparison.  The early uses of DNA as a method of individualization often used the 
term “genetic fingerprinting”—a more apt use of the concept.  See SIMON A. COLE, SUSPECT 
IDENTITIES: A HISTORY OF FINGERPRINTING AND CRIMINAL IDENTIFICATION 289 (2001) 
(discussing the use of the term “genetic fingerprinting” with reference to DNA profiling). 
 71. Farwell & Smith, supra note 70, at 141. 
 72. See Ornstein, Ceci, & Loftus, supra note 5, at 1029-30. 
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Scholars have leveled serious criticism at Farwell,73
 
going so far as 
to label him “notorious” for the claims he has made.74
  
Other scholars 
note that “Farwell’s claims are widely discounted in the relevant 
scientific community . . . .”75
  
There is little research—other than 
Farwell’s—to back up his claims, and he apparently refuses to allow 
others to review his algorithms, claiming his technique is proprietary.76  
Dr. J. Peter Rosenfeld of Northwestern University, one of the early 
scientists involved with EEG-based deception testing with Farwell, has 
written an in-depth critique of the technical shortcoming of Brain 
Fingerprinting, detailing the misleading nature of Farwell’s claims.77 
The BEOS test allegedly builds on Farwell’s work, and it has been 
admitted in court in India.  The inventors claim that the system can 
distinguish between memories of events witnessed and deeds that have 
been committed.78  Like Farwell’s work, the BEOS test has met with 
much skepticism, despite its recent use in Indian courts.  Dr. Rosenfeld 
accurately notes that such technology, which is “neither seriously peer-
reviewed nor independently replicated, [is] not . . . credible.”79  Dr. 
Michael Gazzaniga, director of the MacArthur Law & Science Project,80 
is likewise dismissive of BEOS, stating that “[a]ll the experts agree.  The 
work is shaky at best.”81 
A further question about the validity and reliability of both fMRI 
and EEG images of deception concerns the financial stakes involved in 
the neuroimaging of deception.  Even if one assumes the scientists are 
acting in good faith, the race to the courthouse has financial implications 
that should be considered in the evaluation of such science,82 a point 
recognized in the remand of the well-known Daubert opinion.83 
 
 73. See Sara Solovitch, Mind Reader, LEGAL AFFAIRS, Nov.-Dec. 2004, at 66-67 (noting that 
“many scientists accuse Farwell of making misleading and exaggerated claims”). 
 74. MORENO, supra note 30, at 104. 
 75. Greely and Iles, supra note 49, at 388. 
 76. Solovitch, supra note 73, at 70. 
 77. See J. Peter Rosenfeld, “Brain Fingerprinting”: A Critical Analysis, 4 SCI. REV. OF 
MENTAL HEALTH PRAC. 20, 20 (2005). 
 78. See Anand Giridharadas, India’s Novel Use of Brain Scans in Courts is Debated, N.Y. 
TIMES, Sept. 15, 2008, at A10. 
 79. Id. 
 80. See Governance, http://www.lawandneuroscienceproject.org/governance.php (last visited 
Feb. 18, 2009). 
 81. Giridharadas, supra note 78. 
 82. See JAY D. ARONSON, GENETIC WITNESS: SCIENCE, LAW AND CONTROVERSY IN THE 
MAKING OF DNA PROFILING 5-6 (2007) (discussing Cellmark and Lifecodes’ quest to become the 
dominant DNA Profiling company in the United States and the errors discovered in their methods 
long after much DNA evidence was admitted).  Accord COLE, supra note 70, at 287-302 (2001) 
(discussing the early development of DNA profiling and explaining some of the problems 
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These foregoing critiques do not imply that the science is not 
promising; it just may be promising more than it can deliver at this point 
in time.  It is wiser, I believe, to spend more time in the lab than to rush 
the science to the courtroom where, after destroying lives, we have 
discovered that, indeed, there was more work to be done. 
V.  ADMISSIBILITY STANDARDS: RELIABILITY AND GENERAL 
ACCEPTANCE 
No reported case has yet to admit fMRI evidence at trial as proof of 
deception (or lack of deception), but it seems likely that advocates will 
attempt to convince courts to do so in the relatively near future, 
particularly in light of the claims made by companies hoping to be the 
first to open the courthouse doors.  Since the evidence is novel and 
serves the same evidentiary purpose as the polygraph, I would expect 
most courts to be hesitant in admitting such evidence.  But perhaps it 
will not be that straightforward.  If history has taught us anything about 
forensic science in criminal cases (which are the most likely cases in 
which this evidence would be admitted), the rule has been to admit 
prosecutorial expert testimony and exclude defense uses of such 
evidence.84 
For this neuroimaging evidence to be admissible, the advocate of 
such evidence must be able, depending on the jurisdiction, to convince a 
trial court that this proposed expert evidence is either scientifically 
reliable85 or that the scientific theory at issue is generally accepted 
 
associated with the commercial laboratories).  Both Cephos and No Lie MRI are commercial 
ventures designed to capitalize on fMRI research, as is Farwell’s Brain Fingerprinting company.  
For further details on these companies, see Moriarty, supra note 36, at 33-34. 
83. That an expert testifies for money does not necessarily cast doubt on the reliability 
of his testimony, as few experts appear in court merely as an eleemosynary gesture.  But 
in determining whether proposed expert testimony amounts to good science, we may not 
ignore the fact that a scientist’s normal workplace is the lab or the field, not the 
courtroom or the lawyer’s office.   
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 43 F.3d 1311, 1317 (9th Cir. 1995).  Despite recognizing the 
importance of finances in expert testimony, Judge Kozinski exempts forensic science from this 
inquiry.  “Fingerprint analysis, voice recognition, DNA fingerprinting, and a variety of other 
scientific endeavors closely tied to law enforcement may indeed have the courtroom as a principal 
theatre of operations.”  Id. at 1317 n.5.  In another article, I have challenged this distinction.  See 
Moriarty, supra note 7, at 39-42. 
 84. See NAS REPORT ON FORENSIC SCIENCE, supra note 10, at 3-9 to 3-11.  Moreover, in 
United States v. Scheffer, where the Court remarked that there was no consensus on polygraph 
reliability, it was the defendant who was seeking to admit such evidence.  523 U.S. 303, 306 (1998). 
 85. See, e.g., FED. R. OF EVID. 702 (providing, in pertinent part, that an expert may testify if 
“(1) the testimony is based upon sufficient facts or data, (2) the testimony is the product of reliable 
principles and methods, and (3) the witness has applied the principles and methods reliably to the 
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within the field.86  Despite the claims of those attempting to market the 
neuroimaging of deception, it should be beyond cavil at this point in 
time that neuroimages of deception satisfy neither of these tests.  Even if 
elemental questions concerning deception can be accurately visualized 
on a neuroimage with a cooperating subject, there is too great an analytic 
gap from data generated to conclusions about whether a particular 
person is deceptive to satisfy any standard of legal admissibility. 
The United States Supreme Court has held that the Federal Rules of 
Evidence (“FRE”) “occupy the field” in federal courts; that is to say, the 
Rules provide the primary source of law for the federal judiciary in 
deciding whether evidence should be admitted.87  In 2000, FRE 702, 
governing the admission of expert testimony, adopted a reliability 
standard in which the proposed testimony must be based on sufficient 
facts or data, must be the product of reliable principles and methods, and 
the witness testifying must have applied such principles and methods in 
a reliable fashion to the facts of the case.88 
FRE 702 is an attempt to distill the requirements of the Supreme 
Court’s trilogy of cases that govern the admission of expert evidence.89  
Collectively, these cases (and the amended FRE 702) exhibit a concern 
not just about whether the evidence is generally reliable but about 
whether evidence is reliable as used in a given case.  “[R]eliability 
cannot be judged globally, ‘as drafted,’ but only specifically, ‘as 
applied.’  The emphasis [is] on the judgment of reliability as it applies to 
 
facts of the case”).  Accord Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 590 (1993); 
General Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 144-45 (1997); Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 
137, 141 (1999) (requiring sufficient proof that the proposed expert evidence is sufficiently reliable 
to be admitted). 
 86. While the foregoing federal reliability standard is used in many states, other states follow 
the so-called “general acceptance” standard, which originated in Frye v. United States.  293 F. 1013, 
1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923); see, e.g., Grady v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 839 A.2d 1038, 1045 (Pa. 2003) (holding 
that an expert’s methodology must be generally accepted); Logerquist v. McVey, 1 P.3d 113, 122 
(Ariz. 2000) (holding that the general acceptance test applies to novel scientific evidence). 
 87. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 587. 
 88. Federal Rule of Evidence 702, entitled “Testimony By Experts,” provides that: 
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to 
understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert 
by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of 
an opinion or otherwise, if (1) the testimony is based upon sufficient facts or data, (2) the 
testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods, and (3) the witness has 
applied the principles and methods reliably to the facts of the case. 
FED. R. EVID. 702. 
 89. See FED. R. EVID. 702 advisory committee note (“Rule 702 has been amended in response 
to Daubert . . . and the many cases applying Daubert . . . .”).  Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 
509 U.S. 579 (1993); General Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136 (1997); Kumho Tire Co. v. 
Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999). 
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the individual case, to the ‘task at hand . . . .’”90  Thus, while an x-ray 
may be reliable evidence of a skull fracture, it might not be reliable 
evidence to support the expert’s claim that a given defendant was legally 
insane at the time he committed a homicide.  It is not that the x-ray itself 
is an unreliable bit of evidence; it is that the interpretation of such 
evidence may lack evidentiary reliability.  The interpretation of the 
image is what rests on a less-than-solid foundation. 
Daubert, and cases following, envision a flexible standard, in 
which the trial court, as gatekeeper of the evidence, determines whether 
expert evidence meets the minimal standard of evidentiary reliability.  If 
it does, the evidence is admissible and any shortcomings in the evidence 
go to weight, not admissibility.  In determining whether evidence meets 
the standard of evidentiary reliability, the Daubert Court (and 
innumerable cases since) focused on several “observations” that the 
Court deemed helpful in determining evidentiary reliability: (1) whether 
the theory or technique can be or has been tested, (2) whether the theory 
or technique has been subjected to peer review and publication, (3) the 
potential or known rate of error of the theory or technique when applied, 
(4) the existence and maintenance of standards controlling the 
technique’s operation, and (5) whether the technique or theory has been 
generally accepted in the relevant scientific community.91  This flexible 
standard for expert testimony was premised on the idea of “evidentiary 
reliability” or “trustworthiness.”  Rather than wholesale exclusion, 
Daubert opined that “[v]igorous cross-examination, presentation of 
contrary evidence, and careful instruction on the burden of proof,” 
coupled with the court’s power to direct verdicts and grant summary 
judgment, were the “appropriate means of attacking shaky but 
admissible evidence.”92  One difficulty Daubert poses, of course, is 
determining the proper line that separates “shaky but admissible” from 
“unreliable thus inadmissible.” 
The Daubert Court limited the trial court’s focus on reliability to 
the methodology employed, not the conclusions generated.93  In one of 
the subsequent trilogy of cases the Supreme Court decided, General 
Electric Co. v. Joiner,94 the Court softened the line between 
methodology and conclusions, stating that 
 
 90. D. Michael Risinger, Defining the “Task At Hand”: Non-Science Forensic Science after 
Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 57 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 767, 773 (2000). 
 91. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 592-94. 
 92. Id. at 596. 
 93. Id. at 595. 
 94. 522 U.S. 136 (1997). 
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conclusions and methodology are not entirely distinct from one 
another.  Trained experts commonly extrapolate from existing data.  
But nothing in either Daubert or the Federal Rules of Evidence 
requires a district court to admit opinion evidence that is connected to 
existing data only by the ipse dixit of the expert.  A court may 
conclude that there is simply too great an analytical gap between the 
data and the opinion proffered.95 
The recognition that there may be “simply too great an analytic gap 
between the data and opinion proffered” is one that is particularly apt in 
analyzing the legal admissibility of neuroimages of deception. 
In the final case of the trilogy, Kumho Tire v. Carmichael, the 
Court described the discretion the trial court had in determining whether 
and how these factors should be considered by the trial court: 
We . . . conclude that a trial court may consider one or more of the 
more specific factors that Daubert mentioned when doing so will help 
determine that testimony’s reliability.  But . . . the test of reliability is 
“flexible,” and . . . the law grants a district court the same broad 
latitude when it decides how to determine reliability as it enjoys in 
respect to its ultimate reliability determination.96 
Although the trilogy embraces a flexible standard, the language of 
Kumho Tire provides an important recommendation: “[A] trial court 
should consider the specific factors identified in Daubert where they are 
reasonable measures of the reliability of expert testimony.”97  The 
factors provide reasonable measures of the reliability of neuroimaging 
evidence. 
Not all jurisdictions, however, use a reliability standard.  Rather, a 
number of courts still use the so-called “general acceptance” test, which 
emanates from a 1923 D.C. Court of Appeals decision holding that the 
precursor to the polygraph had not yet reached a state of scientific 
general acceptance required to be admissible.98  The Frye test does not 
analyze the reliability of the proposed evidence; it asks whether novel 
scientific evidence has reached the tipping point at which it has become 
generally accepted by scientists in the field. 
For many decades after the original decision, the Frye test was 
mentioned infrequently, but during the 1970s and 1980s, it became the 
“the icon for one of the dominant notions of the proper criterion for the 
 
 95. Id. at 146. 
 96. 526 U.S. 137, 141 (1999). 
 97. Id. at 152. 
 98. Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923). 
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admissibility of scientific evidence—general acceptance within its 
field.”99 
In theory, the test is a fairly straightforward one for the courts—it 
simply requires courts to determine whether the proponent of the 
evidence has established that a novel theory is accepted in the scientific 
arena.  In practice, however, Frye is a more complicated inquiry and a 
standard that has been criticized on various grounds, including its failure 
to mesh well with a scientific inquiry.100 
Although the federal courts do not follow the Frye general 
acceptance standard, a sizeable minority of states continue to do so.101  
Moreover, while the federal courts follow a reliability standard, general 
acceptance often plays a role in admissibility decisions. 
VI.  WHY fMRI, BRAIN FINGERPRINTING, AND BEOS IMAGES OF 
DECEPTION MEET NEITHER THE RELIABILITY NOR GENERAL 
ACCEPTANCE STANDARDS 
The problems with the forensic use of brain fingerprinting and 
BEOS to detect deception are legion, as discussed above.  Moreover, 
given the roundly critical commentary about these forms of evidence, 
there is no real argument that scientists in that particular field generally 
accept the theory that brain fingerprinting or BEOS can accurately 
indicate when a subject is telling the truth or lying. 
Scientists are creating a fascinating body of work using fMRI to 
depict neural correlates of deception.  These neuroscientists are 
beginning to sketch a portrait of the ways the brain works and the areas 
of the brain that are implicated when a subject attempts to deceive or 
fails to remember accurately.  Sketch, however, may be the operative 
word.  The studies are just beginning; there are numerous questions 
unanswered and numerous areas to be developed.  What does not exist is 
sufficient proof that neuroimages can accurately prove when an 
individual is lying and when she is telling the truth. 
 
 99. David L. Faigman, Elise Porter & Michael J. Saks, Check Your Crystal Ball at the 
Courthouse Door, Please: Exploring the Past, Understanding the Present, and Worrying About the 
Future of Scientific Evidence, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 1799, 1808 (1994). 
 100. See, e.g., United States v. Downing, 753 F.2d 1224, 1236-37 (3d Cir. 1985) (discussing 
criticisms of Frye); Paul C. Giannelli, The Admissibility of Novel Scientific Evidence: Frye v. United 
States a Half-Century Later, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 1197, 1211-12 (1980) (discussing, inter alia, 
criticisms of Frye). 
 101. See 2 JANE CAMPBELL MORIARTY, PSYCHOLOGICAL AND SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE IN 
CRIMINAL TRIALS at app. 1A (2008) (providing a state-by-state analysis of admissibility standards). 
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Taking Daubert’s factors seriously, while the scientists can show 
that the subject can be tested and that there is developing an accuracy 
rate of somewhere between seventy-five and ninety percent, as published 
in peer-reviewed journals, there is still a very long way to go before such 
an error rate is within acceptable limits.  Moreover, while some 
scientists working on neuroimaging and deception studies might claim 
these studies are solid proof, there are other, more critical studies from 
disinterested scholars about shortcomings in the methods and standards.  
When even Dr. Langleben, one of the first neuroscientists to depict 
neuroimages related to deception, says the science is not ready, courts 
should, indeed must, listen.  To date, those who advocate for the 
admission of such evidence are only those with a financial stake in the 
admissibility of such evidence.102 
There is a small number of studies; all of these studies have 
substantial shortcomings that do not allow realistic application of the 
data generated to real-world conclusions about an individual; there are 
complicated problems of differing formats, technology, and testing 
methods; the studies have tested few people, all of whom are healthy; 
and so on.  While fMRI may indicate what areas of the brain are 
implicated in deception, we will need to know what else those areas of 
the brain indicate before any meaningful conclusions can be drawn. 
Moreover, while there are several peer-reviewed studies, the 
purpose of the peer review system has not yet been met with 
neuroimaging: to allow other scientists to attempt to replicate the results 
and to engage in critical analysis of others’ conclusions.  “Research 
science is all about replication and rival interpretations.”103  Given that 
the science is in its infancy, we should expect much more in the way of 
robust criticism from various sources before we decide the evidence is 
sufficiently trustworthy for the courtroom. 
As outlined above, the most substantial question is the appropriate 
inference that can be drawn from the image projected.  It is, to use the 
parlance of Joiner, the “ipse dixit” problem; the gap between the existing 
data and the opinion about the meaning of such data.  And that is a wide 
gap indeed at this point in time.104 
 
 102. See Harrington v. State, 659 N.W. 2d 509, 512 (Iowa 2003); Farwell, supra note 70, at 
1.1.14; Our Business is the Truth, http://www.cephoscorp.com/index.htm (last visited Mar. 6, 
2009). 
 103. See Roger Koppl, Presentation at Forensic Science for the 21st Century: The National 
Academy of Sciences’ Report and Beyond,  Sandra Day O’Connor College of Law, Arizona State 
University (Apr. 4, 2009), http://lst.law.asu.edu/FS09/index.html. 
 104. History provides a lesson here. As Professor Moenssens cogently states: 
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There are other questions, of course, that do not specifically relate 
to admissibility standards and that relate to this continual quest, from the 
Salem witchcraft trials forward, to find the proper way to extract “truth” 
for purposes of proof.  It is a question beyond the narrow scope of this 
article but is at the heart of any attempt to introduce this type of evidence 
in a courtroom. 
There is a unique opportunity here with the fMRI neuroimaging of 
deception that has been missed with other forms of expert evidence 
introduced in criminal trials: the science is developing outside of the 
courtroom in multiple, competing laboratories that are testing different 
aspects of the scientific endeavor.  While one group works on mapping 
specific areas of the brain that seem to be implicated with deceptive 
answers, other groups are considering what parts of the brain are 
involved when there is emotional arousal entwined with the memory of 
the event.  The science is developing and, to date, it has not really 
entered the courtroom.105  The critics are also publishing articles, leading 
to a more balanced picture of the limitations of the science. 
By comparison, most forensic science was developed specifically to 
aid the criminal justice system and was “grandfathered” into the 
courtroom as reliable—without serious proof of validity or reliability.106  
Most recently, in the National Academy of Sciences’ scathing report on 
the shortcomings of forensic science, they found that much forensic 
science evidence has been admitted in criminal trials “without any 
meaningful scientific validation, determination of error rates, or 
reliability testing to explain the limits of the discipline.”107  Admitting 
evidence first and asking questions later (if ever) is the evidentiary 
 
But the longer one observes the disciplines of the forensic sciences, the more one has to 
deal with strongly conflicting emotions. On the one hand, one admires the truly 
revolutionary new methods that have been and are being developed.  On the other hand, 
one remembers some horror stories of the past when too much haste in rushing new 
methods through the evidentiary hoops resulted in convictions on less than sound 
scientific bases.  I urge caution because its absence is the antithesis of the scientific 
method; lack of caution leads to grievous error that tends to bring forensic science into 
disrepute. 
Andre A. Moenssens, Novel Scientific Evidence in Criminal Cases: Some Words of Caution, 84 J. 
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1, 4-5 (1993). 
 105. There is one exception in which a trial court admitted Farwell’s brain fingerprinting 
evidence in a hearing, although it declined to discuss its value in the opinion, nor did it rely on such 
evidence when reaching its opinion.  See Harrington, 659 N.W.2d at 512. 
 106. See generally COLE, supra note 70 (discussing, inter alia, the history of admissibility of 
fingerprint comparison); Jane Campbell Moriarty & Michael J. Saks, Forensic Science: Grand 
Goals, Tragic Flaws & Judicial Gatekeeping, 44 A.B.A. JUDGES’ J. 16, 28 (2005) (discussing the 
ready admissibility of prosecutorial forensic science evidence). 
 107. NAS FORENSIC SCIENCE REPORT, supra note 10, at 3-18. 
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pattern that most forensic science has followed, and it is a flawed and 
problematic approach for new and developing scientific evidence.  Both 
with fMRI and DNA evidence, the science is complex and has powerful 
potential to profoundly affect the outcomes in cases.108 
In the case of DNA profiling evidence, the most science-based and 
reliable form of individualization evidence (which attempts to match a 
known sample to a crime scene, victim, or defendant), no serious 
challenge was raised to the evidence for several years after it was first 
admitted.109 
There is a chance, however, to do things differently with fMRI 
evidence of deception.  I would urge an informal evidentiary moratorium 
on admission of this evidence unless and until the science has developed 
to a place where: (1) the scientists and their critics reach consensus that 
the results are truly valid, reliable, reproducible, accurate, and the error 
rate is within an acceptable margin of error; (2) the potential 
confounding problems related to sample size, group versus individual 
determinations, and the potential problems of correlation versus 
causation have been sorted out; and perhaps most importantly, (3) there 
has been time for sufficient moral, ethical, and jurisprudential 
rumination about whether the legal system really wants this type of 
evidence.110  This delay provides time for additional peer review, 
replication of results, robust disagreements, and discovery of 
unanticipated consequences that might arise from this new, fascinating, 
and challenging scientific endeavor. 
 
 108. See id. 
 109. See ARONSON, supra note 82, at 7. 
 110. For more on this subject, see, e.g., Michael S. Pardo and Dennis Patterson, Philosophic 
Foundations of Law and Neuroscience, posted on SSRN.com at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1338763. 
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